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Abstract: Despite significant popularity, the bug bounty process has remained broadly unchanged since its inception,
with limited implementation of gamification aspects. Existing literature recognises that current methods
generate intensive resource demands, and can encounter issues impacting program effectiveness. This paper
proposes a novel bug bounty process aiming to alleviate resource demands and mitigate inherent issues.
Through the additional crowdsourcing of report verification where fellow hackers perform vulnerability
verification and reproduction, the client organisation can reduce overheads at the cost of rewarding more
participants. The incorporation of gamification elements provides a substitute for monetary rewards, as
well as presenting possible mitigation of bug bounty program effectiveness issues. Collectively, traits of
the proposed process appear appropriate for resource and budget-constrained organisations - such Higher
Education institutions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, in-house teams, consulting penetration
testers, or external good-natured researchers would
identify and report security weaknesses to the
accountable organisation. However, with large
estates operating a diverse array of technologies,
those responsible struggle to identify all possible
vulnerabilities. As a result, a growing number of
organisations are attempting to harness the power of
crowdsourcing through the implementation of a bug
bounty program to help combat this problem (Walshe
and Simpson, 2020).
The past decade has seen the rapid adoption,
development and maturity of bug bounty programs
across a variety of organisations and sectors (Walshe
and Simpson, 2020). Organisations such as Google
and Dropbox have adopted bug bounty programs,
with the latter surpassing $1 million in payouts on
the HackerOne platform, while the former rewarded
$6.5 million in 2019, and over $21 million since
its inception (Team, 2020; Google, 2020). Yet,
innovation within the bug bounty sphere remains
scarce. Minimal attention has been given to the
further development of the crowdsourcing process
mechanisms which underpin bug bounty programs,
with limited studies only alluding to the potential for
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further reform (Su and Pan, 2016).
One area of potential innovation is the
introduction of gamification. Current eco-systems
exhibit limited implementation of any gamification
aspects, and despite the developing sector, this design
element has received scant attention in research
concerning bug bounties. As such, it appears that no
study examines the potential implementations and
their possible effectiveness.
Through an exploration of the emerging role
of gamification in an array of contexts, and an
investigation of current bug bounty implementations,
this paper proposes a new bug bounty implementation
employing gamification aspects to provide a both a
cybersecurity solution and an educational resource.
The remainder of this proposal follows four
main sections. Section 2 provides an overview of
existing bug bounty programs, and documents current
gamification implementations in existing programs.
Section 3 outlines the proposal of a novel bug
bounty program utilising gamification, followed by a
discussion of challenges and limitations in Section 4.
Finally, the paper ends with concluding remarks in
Section 5.
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Figure 1: Variants of the bug bounty process. Adapted from
(Ruohonen and Allodi, 2018).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Bug Bounty Programs
Figure 1 illustrates the most popular variants of
the bug bounty process (Fryer and Simperl, 2017).
While in process A the external hacker corresponds
directly to the vendor, process B introduces an
intermediate platform. This intermediary can provide
verification and triage before notification of the
corresponding vendor, transferring the responsibility
of gaining further detail from the hacker from the
vendor to the platform, mitigating the concomitant
administrative impact to the vendor. While a vendor
can enrol on a bug bounty platform, they often pay
additional fees for verification and triaging on top of
bounty sums. Google and GitHub follow a direct
bug bounty process, whereas many organisations
use platforms such as HackerOne and Bugcrowd to
facilitate the indirect process (Google, 2020; GitHub,
2020; HackerOne, 2020; Bugcrowd, 2020).
Typically, a hacker receives a monetary reward
for a successful submission; however, for less critical
vulnerabilities or conservative programs, branded
vendor merchandise or kudos may be awarded
(Laszka et al., 2018; Ruohonen and Allodi, 2018). In
some circumstances, a hacker can receive a further
bonus award for a well-written explanatory report
or a novel discovery (Malladi and Subramanian,
2019). Furthermore, a subsection of ecosystems
use reputation points and associated leaderboards
to reward successful submissions (GitHub, 2020).
These reputation points are often the criteria for
admission to private programs (HackerOne, 2020;
Bugcrowd, 2020).
While direct programs are often public, thus
allowing for submissions from anyone, both major
bug bounty ecosystems facilitate private programs,
where only a subsection of hackers can see
the program details and participate (Malladi and
Subramanian, 2019). The operation of a private
program allows some organisations to test procedures
before going public; however, some programs
remain private for a significant amount of time or
permanently. Consequently, these programs avoid
some issues prevalent in public operations.
2.2 Bug Bounty Issues
The emerging popularity of bug bounties has
revealed systemic issues with existing crowdsourcing
techniques. Previous studies document these
issues and provide potential solutions; however,
investigations examining their effectiveness remain
limited.
A significant, prevailing issue in bug bounties
is the high volume of low-quality submissions (Al-
Banna et al., 2018; Zhao et al., 2016). The insufficient
report quality is a casualty of first-come first-
served response to verified submissions, with hackers
sometimes racing to submit a vulnerability. With
many hackers concentrating on capitalising from
their skills economically, many look to maximise
the number of submissions rather than focusing on
specific vulnerabilities (Hata et al., 2017). Potentially,
this issue is encouraged with admission to private
programs. Consequently, these problems can be
a significant detriment to the effectiveness of a
program, often impeding the verification and triaging
processes (Fryer and Simperl, 2017).
Various solutions attempt to solve this signal-
to-noise ratio. The larger ecosystems attempt to
educate their users to produce greater quality reports,
while some programs will require specific items
of information to gain more significant details.
HackerOne has seen some success in introducing
both signal requirements and rate limiter mechanisms
(Laszka et al., 2016). The former mechanism limits
those who can submit reports based on their ratio
of verified to unverified submissions, whereas the
latter restricts the number of reports an individual can
submit in a given interval (HackerOne, 2016). The
most definitive solution to this issue is the suggestion
to request appropriate features from those outlined in
the 2018 update of the ISO 29147 (ISO/IEC, 2018).
While some submissions, and platforms, may not
warrant all outlined features, the inclusion of several
may lead to an increase in the reproducibility of the
reported vulnerability. Existing research recognises
the critical role played by the reproducibility of a
bug bounty submission, even suggesting that reports
contain features which appear in the ISO standard
(Mu et al., 2018).
An associated problem concerns the issues
surrounding duplicate submissions, a consequence
of the first-come first-served attitude to verified
submissions (Zhao et al., 2017; Laszka et al., 2018).
As discussed, the race to submit first often leads to
reports lacking essential details. In this scenario,
a vendor or platform require further communication
with the hacker to gain the necessary details. In this
time, another hacker may submit a more significant
detailed report for the same vulnerability. The
second report, although possibly more beneficial to
the vendor, under the first-come, first-served attitude
is a duplicate. The treatment of duplicates varies
across bug bounty platforms. Some platforms do
not monetarily reward the duplicate submitter and
instead compensate with non-monetary awards. This
stance towards duplicate reports rewards actively
discourages detailed submissions. How bug bounty
programs handle duplicate reports is in stark contrast
to the closely associated software bug tracking
methods, where reproducing of reports is encouraged
(Just et al., 2008).
A seminal study in this area conducted by Mallart
et al. (Maillart et al., 2017) identified a possible
behavioural trend reminiscent of the St. Petersburg
Paradox within bug bounty program ecosystems. The
probability of finding a given number of bugs and
their associated payoffs govern a hacker’s aim to
increase earnings. As the average bounty per program
scales super-linearly, while the probability of bug
discovery decays rapidly, there is less incentive to
explore the depth of a vendor for bugs. Consequently,
through incentivisation of increased earnings, hackers
diversify their portfolio by switching programs (Zhao
et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2015). Without greater
incentivisation to outweigh the decreased probability
to discover bugs, there is a potential problem with
incomplete coverage possibly leading to a false
perception of security. The heterogeneity of hacker
skillsets may mitigate this problem to some extent
(Hata et al., 2017).
The issue of hackers switching programs is
amplified upon the launch of a newly launched
program. In this scenario, existing bounty programs
will receive fewer reports, more so when rewards
provided by new programs are higher. However,
the impact of this also depends on factors such
as reputation and reward payouts (Maillart et al.,
2017). This problem likely impacts bug bounty
platforms where there are many programs, rather than
the organisations with their own direct programs.
However, existing programs can similarly exploit
this phenomenon by releasing their scope in stages
(O’Hare, 2019).
To facilitate an improved bug bounty process,
we propose an implementation featuring elements of
gamification to address issues found in traditional
programs.
2.3 Gamification
2.3.1 Nomenclature
Several terms have been used to describe the use of
game mechanics and elements in non-game settings.
One such term used is gamification, defined as
“the application of gaming mechanics to non-gaming
environments”(Growth Engineering, 2018).
The concepts of serious games and applied games
are often linked with the notion of gamification,
however these are distinctly different. Serious games
are “a game in which education (in its various forms)
is the primary goal, rather than entertainment”
(Michael and Chen, 2005). Applied games on the
other-hand are “an implementation of a subject,
inspired by and designed along a context and user-
centric transfer of design concepts and qualities from
the game world” (Schmidt et al., 2015).
Thus in the context of this paper, the term
gamification has been used as the appropriate term to
encompass game mechanics and elements.
2.3.2 Applications of Gamification
Elements of gamification can be presented in many
forms and the usage of particular elements should
be considered in the context of the environment in
which they are placed. Existing work acknowledges
there are at least 52 possible elements of gamification
elements and mechanics which can be incorporated
into a variety of contexts, though this is not an
exhaustive list (Marczewski, 2020a). Mechanics and
elements can include the use of social networks,
encouraging exploration, challenges, and the sharing
of knowledge. User types have also been considered
and provide a link to which gamification elements
might be better suited to different individuals e.g.
free spirits who are motivated by autonomy and
may enjoy exploration elements, and disruptors who
are motivated by change and may prefer a level of
anonymity (Marczewski, 2020a). These user types
have been verified by empirical research (Tondello
et al., 2019).
Other researchers have created a taxonomy
of gamification elements linked to the level of
commitment required by the user when interacting
with such components (Robinson and Bellotti, 2013)
. Many gamification elements are considered low-
level commitments and are items which should be
easily understood, for example, general indicators
to provide users with feedback. Others, such as
an “ambiguous path to objective” require a higher
level of commitment, particularly if there are multiple
puzzles to solve to reach this point.
Gamification has been used in a number of
domains, namely education. Perhaps one of the most
popular examples of gamification is the Duolingo
application (Duolingo, 2020), which helps people
learn a new language, and has over 300 million users
to date. The application makes use of a variety of
gamification elements including badges, rewards, and
trophies, in addition to its expansive learner paths
(Solis, 2015).
Higher Education institutions have also made
use of gamification whilst teaching students. Delft
University of Technology in the Netherlands
integrated gamification into a first-year BSc module
on Computer Organization, and an MSc module
focusing on Cloud Computing (Iosup and Epema,
2014). Mechanics utilised included points, levels and
leaderboards, and additional dynamics included the
use of badges, onboarding, social engagement and
methods of unlocking content. The research found
that the introduction of gamification benefitted the
students, facilitated interaction, and kept students
motivated throughout the semester.
To explore the area further, researchers have
performed a systematic literature review examining
the use of gamification in higher education (Subhash
and Cudney, 2018). The work found that there
was growing support for the use of gamification
in Higher Education, with Spain being a leading
country in the field. Furthermore it was found that
much of the research was being conducted within
the field of computing, and that “points, badges,
and leaderboard were the most commonly used game
elements for gamification of courses” (Subhash and
Cudney, 2018).
Use of the concept is also growing in the field
of cybersecurity. In 2013, research was published
outlining a possible design solution to create a cyber
defence training platform (Amorim et al., 2013). A
gamified, modular approach would allow new threats
to be added to the system on a regular basis, keeping
the user engaged and ensure their skills were up-to-
date.
Gamification and cybersecurity have been
combined to help non-experts learn about the
potential consequences of cybersecurity issues.
The development of a gamified environment has
been proposed which would include elements such
as leaderboards and onboarding tutorials to help
senior executives at critical national infrastructure
Figure 2: Proposed bug bounty process using two phases of
crowdsourcing.
facilities decide how to invest in cyber defenses
(Cook et al., 2016) . Preliminary work has also
been conducted to attempt to improve security
awareness in non-cybersecurity experts via the use
of gamification (Scholefield and Shepherd, 2019).
Several gamification features were included such
as a specific theme (medieval RPG theme), a timer
to increase pressure, consequences (points lost
for wrong answers), and a leaderboard to foster
competition. A prototype quiz application was
developed to educate users about password security,
and a pilot study produced positive results.
2.3.3 Gamification and Bug Bounty Programs
Despite the usage of gamification techniques in
the field of education and cybersecurity, limited
work has been conducted to examine the role of
these techniques in the context of a bug bounty
program. GitHub (GitHub, 2020) employs the
use of points and badges within their bug bounty
program, whereas Bugcrowd (Bugcrowd, 2020) and
HackerOne (HackerOne, 2020) feature reputation-
style systems. However, the implementation of
gamification techniques into bug bounty programs
is generally limited, or non-existent in the majority
of cases, for example, some programs incorporate a
leaderboard, or the similar concept of a Hall of Fame
(Votipka et al., 2018; Ruohonen and Allodi, 2018;
Malladi and Subramanian, 2019).
To fully incorporate elements of gamification into
a bug bounty program, we propose a novel process
which will address issues found within existing
programs.
3 METHODOLOGY
This section looks to introduce and outline a novel
bug bounty process which through design, and the use
of gamification, may mitigate some problems inherent
in existing processes.
3.1 Direct Crowd-vetted Bug Bounty
The proposed bug bounty process follows a four step
procedure, as presented in Figure 2.
1. A Hacker discovers a vulnerability and reports
this finding to the vendor through appropriate
channels.
2. After optionally validating the report and
checking for duplicates, the vendor redistributes
this submission to a field of vetted hackers.
3. These hackers, if possible, verify the original
submission, and report back to the vendor on the
verification and reproducibility of the report.
4. The vendor will receive an actionable
vulnerability report or sound reasoning to
dismiss the submission. The original hacker will
receive a reward or feedback depending on the
success of verification, while the verifiers will
receive a reward regardless.
While this proposal utilises a direct process,
an intermediary exists in the form of a vetted
hacker verification. This peer-review process is the
unique aspect of the methodology, introducing further
crowdsourcing into the bug bounty process.
This process poses many strengths. With less
vendor interaction required, this process provides
a significantly reduced overhead. In theory, the
further crowdsourcing process should provide an
increase in reports verified as a consensus is required.
Furthermore, this process shows potential as an
educational resource. verifiers will become exposed
to new methods when reproducing submissions; who
can then hunt bugs using the same methods - similar
to disclosed reports (Zhao et al., 2015; Votipka et al.,
2018).
The proposed process is not without fault.
Without vendor intervention, the verification process
would dismiss a valid yet out of scope vulnerability.
Although out of scope, if critical, these vulnerabilities
are typically addressed on a case-by-case basis in
existing bug bounty platforms. Additionally, this
optional vendor validation can function as a safety-
net to catch duplicate vulnerabilities with a possible
alternative being an obfuscated current issue tracker.
However, the extent of this vendor intervention comes
at the cost of increased overhead. Furthermore,
a poor uptake or sustained decrease in overall
participants would significantly limit the effectiveness
of a program, potentially increasing the time to
respond, and may contribute to further issues and
threats. Moreover, the increase in participants in
the process comes with an array of potential issues.
In comparison to existing methods, this process
introduces an increased demand on the rewards
required to operate.
Nevertheless, this process presents significant
opportunities for further development. Whereas
current bug bounty processes concentrate on the
reporter, this novel process allows for the vendor
organisation to build relationships with verifiers as
well. Through these relationships, a community
focused on the program can be built (Votipka et al.,
2018). Where the more reputable individuals can
gain invitations to private program-like access to
new scope in creases. As there is a greater
number of external participants in this process in
comparison to existing methods, there are more
opportunities to implement gamification elements
towards participation, incentivisation and rewards.
However, this process does introduce specific
threats arising from the introduction of individuals
upstream other than the vendor (Hata et al.,
2017). One particular issue is the difficulty
in maintaining a consistent barometer for verified
vulnerabilities with a rotating cast of verifiers of
differing expertise (Sanagavarapu and Reddy, 2018).
These verifiers themselves also introduce several
potential threats; a verifier may breach confidentiality
and leak information regarding the vulnerability
resulting in external exploitation and concomitant
issues, including negative press and stock fluctuation.
Similarly, verifiers may collude with the reporter to
receive rewards without proper scrutiny. On the other
hand, a verifier may seek the dismissal of a report,
only to then submit the same issue themselves.
The proposed methodology borrows heavily from
work by Su and Pan (Su and Pan, 2016). The
original proposal appears to be the first to suggest
the crowdsourcing of both vulnerability discovery
and verification. However, this work differs from
the original by limiting the number of roles in
the bug bounty process and allowing individuals to
verify vulnerabilities as they see fit. Additionally,
the original proposal appears to focus heavily
on discovery and verification, neglecting other
procedures in the bug bounty process.
3.2 Aspects of Gamification
When developing a gamified bug bounty program,
it is vital to consider challenges typically found
in traditional bug bounty programs; the aspects
of gamification should mitigate these issues, and
provide an improved user experience. Following on
from section 2.2, gamification elements implemented
should aim to address several key areas:
• A1: Ensure the inclusion of all elements of
the overall bug bounty process for each user,
i.e. discovery and verification, and consider the
individuals’ expertise in each of these areas.
• A2: Implementation of gamification elements
should enhance and support the bug bounty
experience.
• A3: Incentivise any and all participation in the
program.
• A4: Encourage prolonged activity across various
aspects of the program.
Existing bug bounty programs typically give little
consideration to such features, however these areas
deserve greater examination within this context.
Gamification elements should encompass all
possible steps of the bug bounty process to satisfy
the criteria outlined in A1. Ensuring symmetry
in gamification elements between vulnerability
discovery and verification would be an example.
This symmetry would value both processes equally,
potentially mitigating the possible neglect for one
system over another. However, such systems should
be dynamic and tailored to one’s strengths and
weaknesses to provide an engaging experience.
Some bug bounty programs currently incentivise
the higher quality submissions, thus enhancing the
bug bounty experience and effectiveness, through
additional monetary rewards (Zhao et al., 2017).
Gamification elements could substitute or reinforce
such a process. Encouraging well-mannered
correspondence, promoting diverse vulnerability
discovery methods, and alignment to pressing
business objectives are all goals further gamification
implementations can pursue in the name of program
effectiveness.
Bug bounty participants are heterogeneous, with
the majority never achieving a successful submission
(Hata et al., 2017). However, in the proposed method,
these less successful participants can still contribute
to the program through the verification process. From
which they can learn from peers, and apply this
new knowledge in their pursuit of vulnerabilities. In
this scenario, a prolific verifier encounters significant
incentivisation to attempt vulnerability discovery and
vice-versa. Other methods to encourage participation
could include initial higher incentives and rewards
overall.
While scope increases and significant codebase
updates can sustain participation in the bug
bounty process, A4 strives to achieve this through
gamification aspects. With a significant decrease
in activity typical after the initial launch window
of a bug bounty, program managers will attempt to
repeat the success through attracting participants to
return with limited-time events with greater rewards.
Such events often coincide with scope increases.
Providing solely monetary incentivisation during this
event can lead to a significant signal-to-noise ratio
impacting the effectiveness of this strategy (Fryer
and Simperl, 2017). Nevertheless, this strategy could
part or whole substitute monetary incentivisation for
gamification elements. Additionally, elements can
encourage continued activity through incentivisation
of repetitive actions in a given time frame, i.e.
verifying a sum of vulnerabilities in a given week.
To address these, we seek to include gamification
concepts which may appeal to all users of the
system (named as general and rewards elements),
and more specific elements which have a a link to
user types (Table 1). In exploring which aspects of
gamification which may be suited to a bug bounty
program, Gamification Inspiration Cards were used
(Marczewski, 2020a), in addition to considering the
context of such a program.
• General: These gamification concepts can work
for a variety of user types and scenarios, and can
be implemented in a number of ways.
– Investment- it is vital to ensure users are
invested in the system (purpose) and that
they will continue to engage. A variety of
methods can be used to foster investment in the
system, including rewards such as badges and
points, leaderboards, and challenges, whereby
the scope increases to keep more experienced
hackers engaged.
– Progress and feedback- Users of the system
need to receive feedback in order to remain
engaged, and to highlight their advancement
through the system. Feedback can be provided
in a number of forms, including badges and
achievements.
– Onboarding and tutorials- If users are unsure
how the platform works, this could lead to a
lack of engagement after a short time using the
system. The will help users get used to the
aspects of the system and help engagement.
• Rewards:
– Fixed reward schedule- These rewards can
be awarded based on specific events within
the system, for example, the first submission
to the program could provide the user with
double the number of points they would
typically receive. These rewards could also be
delivered based upon milestone achievements,
such as awarding a badge for every 10 verified
submissions to the program. Providing fixed
objectives may assist in addressing issues
concerning sustaining participants and their
attention.
– Other rewards- There are other rewards which
can be included within the program however
these are typically tied to user type (e.g. the
Player user type is said to be motivated by
rewards). Rewards pertaining to specific user
types will be discussed in Table 1.
The culmination of these gamification elements
will ensure that the system is not relying on simplistic
leaderboards.
There are a number of user types and associated
gamification elements which are deemed appropriate
for use in the bug bounty program (Marczewski,
2020a). These include:
• Players: Users who are motivated by rewards.
This links in with work conducted by Hata et
al. (Hata et al., 2017) “Archetype 2” (project
specific contributor to a bug bounty program) and
“Archetype 3” (non-project specific contributor to
a bug bounty program) both tend to be motivated
by rewards, with “Archetype 2” spending more
effort than “Archetype 3”(Hata et al., 2017).
• Achievers: Those who seek to master a particular
subject area.
• Socialisers: Individuals who want some form of
social interaction from the program.
• Philanthropists: Individuals who are altruistic
and require meaning or a purpose behind a
platform to engage with it. This user type links in
with existing research which defined “Archetype
2”, a type of contributor to a bug bounty program
who is motivated to help users and to make the
end product secure (Hata et al., 2017)
3.3 Possible Implementation
With the potential for trust-related issues, operating
the proposed bug bounty process in an organisation
with no existing relationship to the external hackers
may invite unwanted risk (Alomar et al., 2020). One
of the organisations with an existing relationship
to an array of hackers is a tertiary educational
institution, where hackers in question are students.
In this scenario, any significant trust issues equate to
disciplinary issues. While in comparison to existing
methods, this process seems most appropriate to a
university setting.
Firstly, the reduced overhead takes away a
considerable upfront burden from the information
services department. However, the bug bounty
could result in numerous sophisticated bug reports
beyond the technical knowledge and remit of the
services department. Secondly, the compatibility with
gamification provides an economical incentivisation
measure. Lastly, the verification process provides
an extracurricular educational resource; however, it
relies on a dedicated uptake to do so.
Implementation of this process at a university
possibly aligns to the Academic Centres of
Excellence in Cyber Security Education (ACE-CSE)
criteria set forth by the UK’s National Cyber Security
Centre (NCSC, 2020). The ACE-CSE program
attempts to offer institutions means to demonstrate
a systematic commitment to cybersecurity. Outwith
academic responsibilities, the applicant institution
must evidence cybersecurity faculty possessing a
role in ensuring the cybersecurity of the university’s
networked infrastructure. Faculty cooperating with
the operation, administration, and encouraging
participation in such a bug bounty program may
satisfy this criterion.
The operation of bug bounty programs at
education institutions seems limited to select
American universities, yet, some British counterparts
do operate vulnerability disclosure policies
(University of York, 2020; University of Oxford,
2020; Bournemouth University, 2020).
4 DISCUSSION
Research has noted that gamification can
improve student-engagement when used in Higher
Education, in addition to increasing motivation and
performance(Subhash and Cudney, 2018). Thus is
it plausible that a bug bounty program could benefit
from an application of gamification components.
Commonly used gamification elements found in
Higher Education (particularly in computing subjects)
include points, badges, and leaderboards, however,
it should be stressed that gamification goes beyond
these elements (Marczewski, 2020b). Work by
Fischer et al. (Fischer et al., 2016) highlights
that the implementation of gamification must fit
within the scope of the technologies and applications
used, and emphasise that emotions, engagement, and
motivation must also factor in to the design of any
such gamification system.
Although gamification appears to be widely used
in Higher Education, commonly in computing-based
subjects, it has its limitations (Subhash and Cudney,
2018). Previous work has implemented a gamification
strategy in a course teaching introductory C
programming at undergraduate level (Ibanez et al.,
2014). To achieve this, a number of gamified
User Type User
Motivation
Gamification
Element
Description & Implementation Issue(s)
Addressed
Badges &
Achievements
Feedback to highlight the user’s
progression through the system.
A1, A2, A3,
A4
Leaderboards Compares users of the system to
each other, and helps to foster
competition. The bug bounty
program should be transparent to
allow these users to link back to the
bugs found and reports verified.
A1, A3, A4
Players Rewards
Points & Experience A form of feedback to show
users they are making progress and
to elevate their position on the
leaderboard.
A1, A2, A3
Certificates Symbolises mastery and could be
used to reward more advanced
hackers within the system.
A1, A2, A3
Achievers Mastery Challenges Increased scope to cater to
advanced hackers. For these
individuals it ensures they are
challenged when using the
program, leading to incentive
for continued engagement.
A1, A2, A3,
A4
Social Status Opportunities for new relationships
e.g. joining a well-performing
group or team. Also fosters a sense
of belonging and may enhance
purpose
A1, A2, A3
Competition The nature of a bug bounty program
lends itself to competition i.e.
hackers are competing to be the first
person/group to find a vulnerability,
and to document it.
A2, A3
Socialisers Relatedness
Guilds or Teams This would allow a user to form
a group or team (either on a local
friends group level, or as part of a
massive online team).
A2, A3
Philanthropists Purpose Meaning or Purpose Clear information on what the
program is trying to achieve, and
how the user is central to the goal.
A2, A3
Table 1: Suitable aspects of gamification for the bug bounty program.
activities were developed, making use of points and
badges, generally improving knowledge acquisition.
Gamification presented issues for some students:
some became disengaged when reaching the round
number of one hundred points, choosing not to
continue with additional tasks. Though the proposed
bug bounty implementation seeks to mitigate such
issues, it is nonetheless a risk that users may become
disengaged after a period of time.
Prior studies that have noted the importance of
reward evolution as the program and organisation
security matures (Zhao et al., 2015; Al-Banna et al.,
2018). One study suggests front-loading the launch
of a program with high payouts, before adjusting
payout structure to decrease payout towards a market
average to allow for greater rewards for complex
vulnerabilities (Votipka et al., 2018). By doing so,
a program can incentivise participation during the
initial release and continue to encourage dedicated
participation when the number of successful reports
tapers. However, such a strategy may be less effective
when a bug bounty operates on a significantly limited
budget or relies on non-monetary rewards. Therefore,
those in this scenario may require alternative
solutions to keep encouraging participation.
While the effectiveness of the proposed bug
bounty program remains speculative, the contrast
with existing methods may lack significance without
a robust remediation process (Alomar et al., 2020).
However, without either paying a platform for
verification or crowdsourcing via the proposed
method, the team responsible for the remediation
process may have to screen a high signal-to-noise
ratio, performing verification and corresponding with
hackers where necessary. By offloading these
responsibilities to a bug bounty platform or the
crowd themselves, the remediation process can
receive greater focus from the internal security
team. Nevertheless, the resolution of any issues
and ineffectiveness with the remediation process is
essential before the implementation of a bug bounty
process.
A natural progression of this work is required
to establish the viability of this novel process in
practice. These future investigations may wish
to explore implementations beyond the educational
sector. Additionally, this paper shows there is ample
room for further development and implementation of
gamification in the bug bounty domain.
5 CONCLUSIONS
By leveraging gamification techniques against
common bug bounty issues, this paper proposed
a new bug bounty implementation intending to
provide a crowdsourcing cybersecurity solution and
an educational resource. Using a higher education
institution as a potential use case allows for the
consideration of the application of gamification
aspects to improve program effectiveness. Without
a trial implementation and concomitant study,
the reality of the process remains uncertain.
However, this proposal highlights the limited use of
gamification in bug bounties thus far and contributes
approaches to implement aspects which may increase
program effectiveness.
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